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I. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF $88,911.67 IN 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Prior to December 5, 1980 (the date the principal and 
interest on the Promissory Notes was paid in full) plaintiffs 
were attempting to recover two debts, the $119,000 due on the 
Promissory Notes (for which attorney fees were recoverable) and 
the $4 9,966.21 due on the Assignment of Contract (for which 
attorney fees were not recoverable.) As to attorney fees 
incurred by plaintiffs prior to December 5, 1980, plaintiffs 
failed to allocate between attorney fees attributable to 
collection of each debt. Only those allocable to collection of 
the Promissory Notes were recoverable. In their analysis, 
plaintiffs failed to recognize this distinction. 
As to attorney fees incurred after December 5, 1980, the 
primary debt that plaintiffs were then trying to collect was the 
$49,966.21 due on the Assignment of Contract since all principal 
and interest on the Promissory Notes had been paid. Attorney 
fees were not recoverable for that debt since the Assignment of 
Contract did not include an attorney fees clause. 
There were some unpaid attorney fees that had been incurred 
in collection of the Promissory Notes prior to December 5, 1980 
that were still owed. However, those fees were relatively minor 
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(less than $5,000.) Furthermore, the Promissory Notes did not 
allow for recovery of attorney fees incurred in the collection of 
those attorney fees. The Promissory Notes only allow for 
recovery of costs and attorney fees for the recovery of the 
unpaid principal and interest due under the Promissory Notes.1 
As of December 5, 1980, there was no principal and interest due 
under the Promissory Notes since all principal and interest had 
been paid in full. Accordingly, after December 5, 1980 no costs 
and attorney fees could have been incurred for recovery of unpaid 
principal and interest. 
Once all principal and interest on the Promissory Notes was 
paid in full on December 5, 1980, there was no further basis for 
plaintiffs to recover any costs and attorney fees thereafter 
incurred by plaintiffs for any reason, except costs and attorney 
fees "incident to" the April 29, 1994 nonjudicial trustee's sale 
lrThe Promissory Notes provide: 
In the case of default in the payment of any 
installment of principal or interest as herein 
stipulated, then it shall be optional with the legal 
holder of the note to declare the entire principal sum 
hereof due and payable; and proceedings may at once be 
instituted for recovery of the same [i.e., recovery of 
principal and interest] by law, with accrued interest 
and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(R. at 469) (emphasis added). 
2 
(to the extent that sale was valid.)2 
Plaintiffs cite Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code as an 
alternate basis for recovery of attorney fees, but that section 
only allows recover of attorney fees if "provided for under the 
agreement under which such claim arose:" 
[T]here shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, 
interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs 
or charges provided for under the agreement under which 
such claim arose. 
11 U.S.C. Section 506(b). 
As discussed above, recovery of attorney fees is not provided for 
at all under the Assignment of Contract (for recovery of the 
$49,966.21 advance) and is only provided for under the Promissory 
Notes for recovery of principal and interest. 
Plaintiffs emphasize that "all amounts expended in the 
bankruptcy proceedings were necessary to protect Timm's security 
interest." (Appellee's Brief at page 19.) That may be true, 
however, there must still be a legal basis to recover attorney 
fees incurred in "protecting Timm's security interest." 
Furthermore, the reason plaintiffs were trying to "protect" their 
"security interest" in the Dewsnup property in the bankruptcy 
proceeding was to use that property to collect on the $49,996.21 
2As discussed in Appellant's Brief, under paragraph 16 of 
the Trust Deed plaintiffs would have been able to recover all 
"costs and expenses incident to" the April 29, 1994 foreclosure, 
including attorneys fees. See Appellant's Brief, page 23-24. 
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debt due under the Assignment of Contract. There was no attorney 
fees provision in the Assignment of Contract. There was no legal 
basis to award plaintiffs attorney fees for "protecting" their 
"security interest" in the Dewsnup property. 
Plaintiffs next argue that "Dewsnup's interpretation would 
completely eviscerate the value of a contract provision for 
attorney fees." (Appellee's Brief, page 19.) This is not true. 
The Assignment of Contract contains no contractual provision 
providing for recovery of attorney fees. The Promissory Notes 
only allow for recovery of attorney fees incurred in the recovery 
of principal and interest on the Promissory Notes. Mrs. Dewsnup 
is only asking the Court to interpret the contracts as they were 
drafted. 
In any event, Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming more 
than $50,530.76 in costs and attorney fees. At the time of the 
foreclosure sale, Mrs. Dewsnup requested from plaintiffs "the 
entire amount" of attorney fees and costs that plaintiff claimed 
were due and owing. The figure provided by plaintiffs was 
$50,530.76. At the hearing held six years later (November 13, 
2000), that figure jumped to $88,911.67. 
At the end of plaintiffs answers to interrogatories 
plaintiffs did state that "[t]his figure does not include 
attorneys fees and costs incurred after April 1, 1994, nor does 
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it include attorneys fees expended by Plaintiffs between April 
29, 1981, and March of 1987." However, the figure given by 
plaintiff as the "entire amount" of attorney fees due and owing 
was $50,530.76. Plaintiffs have waived and/or are estopped from 
claiming any fees in addition to the $50,530.76 figure given. If 
plaintiffs claimed additional attorney fees, they should have 
stated what they were at the time of the foreclosure sale. Mrs. 
Dewsnup had a statutory right to rely on the figure provided by 
plaintiffs in exercising her right to cure under Sections 57-1-31 
and 57-1-40. Plaintiffs cannot give Mrs. Dewsnup one figure at 
the time of the sale, and then six years later, when it suits 
their purpose, provide a different (and much higher) figure. 
Finally, on April 24, 1992, the Dewsnups paid $3,362.37 to 
plaintiffs. In Appellees' Brief, plaintiffs do not dispute that 
Mrs. Dewsnup was not given credit for this payment against any 
costs and attorney fees that may have been due and owing. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEWSNUPS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. Mrs. Dewsnup is Entitled to Summary Judgment Because 
the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sale Violated the "One-
Action" Rule 
Plaintiffs argue that the nonjudicial foreclosure sale does 
not violate the one-action rule since that rule applies to debts 
secured "solely by mortgage upon real estate" and in this case 
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the "Dewsnup's debt on the Promissory Notes was secured by a 
Trust Deed, water rights and Dewsnup's assigned interest in the 
Arrow Contract." (Appellees' Brief, page 35). The "Arrow 
Contract" (an installment sales contract) has been treated as a 
mortgage upon real property in other jurisdictions. See Quintana 
v. Anthony, 712 P.2d 678 (Idaho 1985). Furthermore, water rights 
are "real property." Therefore, all three instruments (the Trust 
Deed, Assignment of Contract and security interest in water 
rights) constitute a "mortgage" upon "real property." Even if 
those assets were construed as "mixed collateral," the one-action 
rule should still apply. See Real Property Collateral: The One-
Action Rule in Action, 1991 Utah Law Review, 557, 576-77, David 
Millner. ("Both the language of UCC Section 9-501(4) as adopted 
in Utah and understanding of the Utah State Bar Committee, 
however, indicate that the rule continues to apply to any 
foreclosure involving real property.") (Emphasis in original.) 
Plaintiffs argue that the Dewsnup bankruptcy "bars 
application" of the one-action rule. Plaintiffs offer no 
authority to support this position and counsel for Mrs. Dewsnup 
is unaware of any such authority. 
Finally, plaintiffs argue that Mrs. Dewsnup has waived the 
right to raise the one-action rule as a defense. Plaintiffs now 
claim that the issue should have been raised as early as 1980. 
After the April 29, 1994 nonjudicial trustee's sale was held, 
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Mrs. Dewsnup promptly raised this issue before the trial court. 
The trial court addressed the issue on the merits and did not 
find the issue to have been untimely raised. The issue was 
timely raised and considered below and is properly before this 
Court on appeal. 
Plaintiffs elected to proceed by filing a Complaint to 
recover the $119,000 due under the Promissory Notes, the 
corresponding costs and attorney fees and the $4 9,966.21 due 
under the Assignment of Contract. The principal and interest due 
on the Promissory Notes was paid in full and plaintiffs obtained 
a Judgment for the $49,966.21 due under the Assignment of 
Contract and $6,985.00 in costs and attorney fees. Having done 
so, plaintiffs must foreclose through judicial (pursuant to Rule 
69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) and cannot thereafter 
commence a nonjudicial foreclosure for the same debt for which a 
Judgment has been obtained. 
B. The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because 
the Noniudicial Foreclosure Sale was Barred by the 
Statute of Limitations 
As discussed in Appellant's Brief, plaintiffs are estopped 
from claiming that the statute of limitations for commencing a 
nonjudicial foreclosure was "tolled" as of 1988 inasmuch as 
plaintiffs filed a Notice of Default to commence their 
nonjudicial foreclosure on August 29, 1988. In response to this, 
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plaintiffs attempt to switch theories, now arguing for the first 
time that it was Mrs. Dewsnups' Motion to Stay (filed in 1989) 
that tolled the statute of limitation. Plaintiffs offer no case 
law or other authority to support this theory. The Order to Stay 
was issued by Judge Thomas Green, United States District Court, 
and did not stay the statute of limitation, either expressly or 
implicitly. Mrs. Dewsnup posted a $10,000 bond which the Court 
held would compensate plaintiffs for any damages as a result of 
the stay. That bond was subsequently released to pay unpaid 
property taxes on the property and to plaintiffs. 
Contrary to plaintiffs' claim, this issue was before the 
trial court and the trial court addressed this issue on the 
merits on pages 3-4 of its Memorandum Decision (R. 916-17.) At a 
minimum this defense gave rise to issues of fact that required an 
evidentiary hearing on whether the statute of limitations had 
been tolled. The trial court erred in dismissing this defense 
without a hearing and holding that, as a matter of law, Mrs. 
Dewsnup had no statute of limitations defense. 
C. The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because 
the Foreclosed Debt was Not Secured by the Trust Deed 
At the time of the foreclosure sale, plaintiffs claimed in 
answers to interrogatories that $222,814.62 in debt was secured 
by the Trust Deed. In the Trustee's Deed, plaintiffs recited 
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that the property was sold to plaintiffs at the foreclosure sale 
for $115,000.00 in "partial satisfaction" of that debt. 
Plaintiffs now claim that under Section 57-1-29 they paid "excess 
proceeds" from the foreclosure sale to themselves as a "person 
legally entitled to the proceeds." Plaintiffs claim that because 
they had a "judgment lien" for $49,966.21, plaintiff's could (and 
did) pay the "balance" from the foreclosure sale to themselves as 
the "person entitled thereto." 
First, under Section 57-1-31 and 57-1-40 Mrs. Dewsnup had a 
statutory right to cure the default and prevent the foreclosure 
sale by paying the amount that was unpaid and secured by the 
trust deed. At most this would have been the portion of $5,000 
representing unpaid attorneys fees at the time that the principal 
and interest was paid in full on December 5, 1980, not 
$222,814.62 as plaintiffs claimed at the time of the foreclosure 
sale. In particular, Mrs. Dewsnup had a statutory right to cure 
the debt secured by the Trust Deed and avoid the foreclosure sale 
without paying the $49,966.21 "judgement lien." This right was 
denied her. 
Second, at the foreclosure sale plaintiff did not pay to 
themselves "excess proceeds" from the nonjudicial trustee's sale 
in accordance with Section 57-1-29, as they now claim. In 
response to interrogatories, plaintiffs claimed that $222,814.62 
9 
was secured by the Trust Deed. The Trustee's Deed states that 
the Property was sold at the foreclosure sale to plaintiffs for 
"$115,000.00 . . . in partial satisfaction of the indebtedness 
then secured by the Deed of Trust." (R. at 440. ) 3 Based on the 
plain language in Trustee's Deed and the plaintiffs answers to 
interrogatories, plaintiffs foreclosed on the Property for debt 
that was not secured by the Trust Deed. This Court has already 
determined that the $49,966,21 debt, plus interest (which 
constituted 166,835.56 of the $222,814.62) was not secured by the 
Trust Deed. See Timm II, 921 P.2d at 1388 (stating that "the 
$49,966.21 . . . debt was not secured by the trust deed"). 
Plaintiffs claim that they paid themselves the balance pursuant 
to Section 57-1-29 is not what actually happened. 
Even assuming that plaintiffs had paid themselves the 
"excess proceeds," they were not the "party entitled thereto." 
The legal effect of plaintiffs' "judgment lien" had long since 
3The Trustee's Deed states: 
The Trustee did, on April 29,1994, at 4:30 p.m. at the 
Millard County Courthouse, sell, at public auction, to 
the Grantees, the United Precision Machine and 
Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust, ABCO 
Insurance Agency, Inc. and Joseph L. Henriod, as 
Trustee for the Annette Jacobs Trust, the highest 
bidders therefore, the property described below for the 
total sum of One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Dollars 
($115,000.00), in partial satisfaction of the 
indebtedness then secured by the Deed of Trust. 
(R. 440.) 
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expired under the eight year statute of limitations for enforcing 
judgments. See Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-22. Plaintiffs 
wjudgment lien" was created on April 24, 1981 and expired on 
April 24, 1989, five years before the trustee's sale. 
Finally, plaintiffs argue that because they were acting in 
"good faith and reliance on a valid judgment" the foreclosure 
sale was legitimate. However, where the issue of whether a debt 
is secured by a trust deed is being litigated, the creditor holds 
a foreclosure sale on that debt at its own risk. Timm III, 1999 
UT 105, HU14-15. 
D. The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because 
Plaintiffs Failed to Mail the Dewsnups a Notice of 
Default or a Notice of Sale 
Plaintiffs' sole argument against voiding the trustee's sale 
because of statutory noncompliance is that Mrs. Dewsnup "had 
actual notice and attempted to block the sale." The only reason 
Mrs. Dewsnup had actual notice of the nonjudicial trustee's sale 
is because she happened to read about it in the newspaper. For 
the reasons discussed in Appellant's Brief, a nonjudicial 
trustee's sale that ignores all of the debtors statutory rights 
is not valid. At a minimum, Mrs. Dewsnup was prejudiced by not 
having notice of the sale three months prior to sale to allow 
time to contest the amount alleged to be secured by the Trust 
Deed and to raise the funds necessary to cure any legitimate 
11 
default under the Trust Deed. 
III. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS7 MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This is the second time that Mrs. Dewsnup has appealed the 
trial court's dismissal of her counterclaims on plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. In Timm IIIf this Court reversed 
the trial court's dismissal of Mrs. Dewsnup's counterclaims: 
We therefore reverse the summary judgment in favor of 
the lenders and the dismissal of Dewsnup's counterclaim 
and remand the case to the trial court to address the 
merits of the Dewsnup's claim for the wrongful 
foreclosure of the trust deed property and the other 
claims and defenses alleged in the counterclaim. 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996.) 
The facts and issues in plaintiffs' first Motion for Summary 
Judgment are the same facts and issues raised in plaintiffs' 
second Motion for Summary Judgment. (See R. at 448-49.) The 
fact that Mrs. Dewsnup did not specifically state again all 
issues and facts that were already on file in responding to 
plaintiffs second Motion for Summary Judgment does not mean that 
these facts and issues were not before the trial court -- they 
were. The trial court is presumed to have notice of the entire 
file and the trial court was advised on at least one occasion by 
counsel that the second Motion for Summary Judgment was basically 
a renewal of the first. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge in their brief that the trial court 
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ruled on these issues prior to Timm III -- "[t]he trial court in 
this matter has already considered these matters and previously 
made specific findings regarding her allegation before Timm III." 
(See Appellee's Brief, page 42.) The previous* trial court ruling 
dismissing Mrs. Dewsnup's Counterclaims was reversed in Timm III, 
and for the same reasons the trial court's ruling dismissing Mrs. 
Dewsnup's counterclaims should be reversed again. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Attorney fees incurred by plaintiffs prior to December 5, 
1980 must be allocated between collection of the principal and 
interest due on Promissory Notes and the collection of $49,996.21 
advance. Only attorney fees incurred in collection of the 
principal and interest due on the Promissory Notes are 
recoverable. After December 5, 1980 (the date all principal and 
interest on the Promissory Notes was paid in full), there was no 
legal basis to recover attorney fees except for attorney fees 
that were "incident to" the April 29, 1994 foreclosure sale. 
Mrs. Dewsnup is entitled to summary judgment on her claim 
for wrongful foreclosure because the sale violated the "one 
action" rule and was barred by the statute of limitations. 
Plaintiffs also foreclosed on Trust Deed for debt not secured by 
the Trust Deed. Furthermore, plaintiffs failed to mail Mrs. 
Dewsnup a notice of default and notice of sale as required by 
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law. 
In addition, the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment because a dispute of material fact 
exists regarding Mrs. Dewsnups' counterclaims. ' All of those 
issues were before the trial court prior to Timm III. This Court 
held in Timm III that those counterclaims should not have been 
dismissed and the Timm III ruling in connection with those 
counterclaims should be reinstated. 
DATED this 6th day of May, 2002. 
Russell A. Cline 
Attorney for Appellant 
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